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ABSTRACT
The Effects of Downstream Distributor Chains on Upstream Producer Entry:
A Bargaining Perspective
by Suchan Chae and Paul Heidhues
This paper studies the effects of integration among downstream local distributors on the
entry of upstream producers in a bargaining theoretic framework. We show that
integration of downstream distributors may increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis
upstream producers and thus lower incentives for entry in the upstream production
industry. In order to explain price formation in such a market, we use a bargaining
solution that generalizes the Nash solution.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Die Auswirkungen von überregionalen Zusammenschlüssen zwischen Händlern
auf den Eintritt von Inputproduzenten: Eine verhandlungstheoretische Analyse
Ausgehend von Industrien mit hohen Fixkosten und vernachlässigbaren Grenzkosten
(z. B. Film- und Fernsehindustrie, Softwareindustrie, Pharmazeutische Industrie) wird
untersucht wie sich überregionale Zusammenschlüsse zwischen "downstream distribu-
tors" (z. B. Kinos, Kabelbetreiber, Einzelhändler, Krankenhäuser bzw. Krankenkassen)
auf die Angebotsvielfalt auswirken. Aus verhandlungstheoretischer Sicht werden dazu
in diesem Beitrag die Auswirkungen von überregionalen Zusammenschlüssen zwischen
lokalen "downstream distributors" auf den Eintritt von Inputpoduzenten untersucht . Es
wird gezeigt wie überregionale Zusammenschlüsse von "distributors" deren Verhand-
lungsmacht gegenüber Inputproduzenten erhöhen können und damit die Anreize zum
Eintritt in die Inputindustrie verringern können.  Hierzu verwendet dieser Beitrag eine
verallgemeinerte Nash-Verhandlungslösung, um die Preisbildung auf dem Inputmarkt
zu analysieren.
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1.  Introduction
In this paper, we consider an input market in which multiple upstream firms sell their prod-
ucts to geographically separated downstream firms. In particular, we look at software-type mar-
kets in which the fixed costs of developing products incurred by upstream firms are substantial 
but the marginal costs of distributing them to downstream firms are negligible. We investigate, 
using a recently developed bargaining model, how the formation of downstream coalitions across 
geographically separated markets affects both the downstream firms’ bargaining power and the 
number of varieties that upstream firms are willing to supply. What we have in mind is a situation 
in which the formation of coalitions (or mergers) is a long term decision, while upstream produc-
tion decisions are short term decisions.
As an illustrative example, suppose that a movie-theater chain in Los Angeles wants to merge 
with a movie-theater chain in New York City. Should regulators be concerned about this merger? 
A casual answer may be no, since across-local-market mergers do not change the market structure 
in the local movie-theater markets. One may argue that local, not national, markets are the rele-
vant markets. Consider the following legal case: After monopolizing the Las Vegas movie-theater 
market, Syufy enterprises was sued by the Department of Justice not for its behavior in the prod-
uct market but for its alleged impact on the input market.1 The government, however, lost its case. 
The judge’s ruling explicitly mentions that Syufy was only a small regional entrepreneur even 
though this was not the main premises of the ruling.2 We believe the case raises important ques-
1. US vs. Syufy enterprises and Raymond Syufy, 1990. 
2. Testimony by one of Syufy’s suppliers revealed that, in his mind, Syufy’s bargaining power was severely 
limited by the fact that Syufy had only 1.3% of the national market share. See Waterman (1996) for a 
detailed discussion.
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tions: Under what conditions do downstream mergers lead to excessive “market power” in the 
input market? How is the national size of a distributor chain related to its “input market power”?
In addition, regulators have been concerned about the national market size in other indus-
tries. For instance, the Cable Act of 1992 ordered the Federal Communications Commission to 
establish legal restrictions on the national size of the multiple cable system operators (MSOs).3 
Interestingly, this legislative action took pace despite the fact that local cable companies typically 
have nearly 100 percent market share on the output market. 
Recently, the merger between AT&T and MediaOne lead to a debate as to whether these own-
ership rules are appropriate.4 Proponents of the ownership restrictions, including consumer advo-
cates, argue that they are necessary to ensure sufficient “variety” in the programing, especially as 
broadband cable allows for practically unlimited programming. Critics of the ownership con-
straints argued, among other things, that mergers in the cable industry increase not only cable 
companies’ efficiency in production but also enables cable companies to undertake the necessary 
infrastructure investments to connect customers to broadband cable. Our model examines the 
merits of both arguments and highlights the trade-off that policy makers face. Obviously, the 
results of this paper have implications for many other industries. The paper not only explains why 
distributor coalitions, such as hospital alliances in the market for pharmaceutical products, form 
but also predicts what consequences they might have. 
To investigate the “market power” of distributor chains in the input market, one has to model 
how input prices are determined. In an equilibrium with free entry, one should expect upstream 
3. See Congress of the United States (1992). 
4. Broadcasting & Cable, May 1999, pp 10-11; New York Times, August 18, 1999, p 1; New York Times, 
September 10, 1999, p 1.
Page 3
producers to earn zero profits. Thus the sum of the (not necessarily uniform) prices distributor 
chains pay should be equal to the fixed cost of developing the product. However, the question of 
how prices are determined in such a market remains an important theoretical issue.
Consider the movie market example again. We view the market for movies as one consisting 
of interconnected bilateral monopoly markets. If we look at each geographical market, a movie 
theater is a local monopolist. If we focus on each movie, a producer is a monopolist. Thus, in 
determining the price that a movie theater pays to gain the right to show a movie, the theater and 
producer both act as bilateral monopolists. Bargaining is a natural mechanism by which prices are 
formed in such a market. 
The challenge lies, however, in extending the traditional bargaining theory to deal with the 
interactions of players between the local markets. In order to deal with such a situation, Chae and 
Heidhues (1999) generalized the well-known Nash solution in two separate directions: first to a 
situation where one party is a coalition of two players, and second to a situation where one party 
bargains with opponents on two fronts. Using the extended solution, they show that two theaters 
in two geographically separate local markets can increase their bargaining power by forming a 
coalition. Intuitively, the more concentrated the movie theater industry, the more important it is 
for a movie producer to resolve the bargaining problem with a movie-theater chain. This weakens 
the movie producer’s position and thus it will concede more of the overall benefits. Thus large 
movie theater chains can affect market prices to their advantage. This in itself, however, has only 
distributional consequences. Even though the integration of the theaters may increase their market 
power, it does not affect aggregate welfare. It only leads to a redistribution of gains from coopera-
tion within a local market from the unintegrated to the integrated players. Thus there is no justifi-
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cation, within the model Chae and Heidhues (1999), for restricting the national size of a theater 
chain.
In this paper, we endogenize movie producers’ entry and show that mergers across local mar-
kets can have efficiency implications, justifying regulatory restrictions on such mergers. The intu-
ition for this result is as follows: Integration across movie-theater chains increases their 
bargaining power. Potential movie producers anticipate the increased bargaining power of movie 
chains and thus expect to receive less for their movies. This reduces incentives to enter the movie 
production industry and therefore decreases the number of movies available. In our model, this 
leads to a decrease of welfare.5
Our treatment of firms and mergers differs from most of the related works in the literature in 
at least two substantial ways: First, we think of a firm’s risk preferences as depending on its own-
ers’ risk preferences. In particular, we do not assume that firms are risk neutral.6 Secondly, we 
regard two firms that merge (i.e., form a coalition) as simply sharing the ownership of all of their 
assets. In particular, we do not model the merger as a buy-out.7 One may think of the owners as 
swapping stocks. The main reason why we do not consider buy-outs is that in our model a buy-out 
is always dominated by joint ownership, for we assume the homogeneity of agents and abstract 
from agency problems.
Our paper is closely related to the literature on input-market bargaining in the presence of oli-
gopolistic product market competition such as Horn and Wolinsky (1988), Dobson and Waterson 
5. From the theoretical point of view, there is no particular reason why mergers occur among downstream 
firms rather than among upstream firms. The model in this paper applies equally well to upstream merg-
ers.
6. One interpretation of this feature can be that capital markets are imperfect. 
7. This is in contrast to, for instance, Kamien and Zang (1990). 
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(1997), and von Ungern-Sternberg (1996). In the first stage of these two stage models, a single 
upstream supplier bargains with multiple downstream firms about the input market price. In the 
second stage, the downstream firms compete with each other, taking the input market price as 
given. The second stage competition thus determines the quantity of the input that each firm 
demands. Because, in these models, the bargaining parties only negotiate over linear transfer 
prices, the negotiated agreement leads to double marginalization.
In Horn and Wolinsky (1988)’s quantity-competition model, a downstream merger is unprof-
itable if firms produce substitutes.8 In their model, downstream competition raises downstream 
firms’ cost of making concessions in the input market bargaining. This changes the slope of the 
bargaining frontier and puts the downstream firms in a stronger bargaining position. Indeed, if 
firms produce substitutes then the positive bargaining effect of a downstream commitment to 
compete overcompensates the forgone benefits of monopolizing the product market.
Dobson and Waterson (1997) have a similar two stage setup in which downstream firms com-
pete in prices rather than quantities. In their solution, the upstream supplier bargains with each 
downstream firm on the incremental benefit of reaching an agreement, assuming that the supplier 
reaches an agreement with each of the other downstream firms. In their model, a downstream 
merger has two effects: First, it increases the rent that a given downstream firm can extract from 
consumers, increasing the pie the players bargain over in the first stage. Second, the supplier has 
fewer alternative outlets available, which increases the incremental benefit of reaching an agree-
ment with a given downstream firm. This reduces the suppliers’ bargaining power and thus makes 
8. To avoid this, in his view absurd, result, von Ungern-Sternberg (1996) requires that the “generalized 
Nash bargaining solution” he claims to use satisfies an additional assumption. This assumption, however, 
implies that von Ungern-Sternberg uses a proportional solution, i.e. a solution in which the bargaining 
parties’ benefits are split Pareto-efficiently according to a fixed sharing rule .a
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a given downstream firm better off. However, downstream firms that merge lose market share to 
their competitors. In fact, Dobson and Waterson do not show that a downstream merger can be 
profitable in their model.
In contrast to the above mentioned papers, mergers in our model do not change the level of 
competition in the downstream industry. Indeed, the major innovation of the bargaining approach 
used is that forming a coalition generates bargaining power in the absence of any substitutability 
between the merging parties. In addition, our paper allows for upstream entry. Thus we need to 
generalize the bargaining game to allow for multiple upstream suppliers.9 This problem has been 
previously addressed in Waterman (1996). Our approach differs from his in that we show how 
mergers affect the firms’ bargaining power rather than simply assert that the national size of a dis-
tributor chain is positively related to bargaining power.
Furthermore, in contrast to Waterman and the aforementioned literature, we do not restrict 
the bargaining agreement to linear transfer prices. Instead, we assume that each bilateral bargain-
ing problem is resolved efficiently. Thus there is no double marginalization. In our model, down-
stream distributors buy the input, such as a movie, before selling it to as many consumers as is 
optimal. In other words, the input market price is a sunk cost when showing the movie and hence 
does not directly affect consumer prices. It may, however, determine how many movies are pro-
duced and thereby how many movies a movie theater wants to show, which in turn may affect 
consumer prices.
The model most closely related to our is perhaps Chipty and Snyder’s (1999) bargaining 
model of the cable industry. In their model, a single producer bargains simultaneously with multi-
9. Among other things, this differentiates the current paper from Chae and Heidhues (1999).
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ple downstream firms, each of which is a monopolist in its downstream market. In each bilateral 
bargaining between the supplier and a downstream firm, the players take as given that all other 
bargaining problems are resolved efficiently. The effective pie they bargain over is thus the incre-
mental benefit of reaching an agreement given that all other bargaining problems are resolved. 
Each bargaining problem is solved using the Nash bargaining solution. Because firms are 
assumed to be risk neutral, the effective pie in any bargaining problem is split equally between the 
upstream supplier and the downstream firm. Thus, in contrast to our model, a downstream merger 
cannot affect the bargaining power of the cable operators, holding the size of the pie as given. It 
may, however, change the effective pie they bargain over. Based on their model and empirical 
data on upstream suppliers’ advertising revenues, Chipty and Snyder maintain that, in the absence 
of any efficiency gains, mergers between cable operators would lower the effective pie over 
which the downstream firms bargain. Hence, mergers would lower the share that the integrating 
cable operators receive. 
Why then do downstream mergers occur? The answer Chipty and Snyder provide is that 
mergers must lead to (non-specified) efficiency gains that can be divided between the bargaining 
parties. In contrast to our model, Chipty and Snyder’s model predicts that upstream suppliers ben-
efit from downstream mergers.10 Their prediction, however, raises the question why broadcasters 
do not lobby in favor of relaxing the existing restrictions on the national size of MSOs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 introduces the model and its 
solution.  Section 3 investigates the consequences of distributor integration.  Section 4 provides 
the conclusion. 
10. This suggests a simple empirical test to differentiate between the two models.
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2.  Model and solution
In this section, we first setup the basic model. Then, we introduce the bargaining solution and 
solve the game.
2.1. Entry and bargaining
We consider a two-stage game that determines the number of products developed and the 
payment producers collect from distributors. Let  be the number of local distributors that 
belong to a distributor chain t, and let l be the number of distributor chains. Then  is 
the total number of local distributors.11 Each distributor is a local monopolist who faces a down-
ward-sloping inverse demand curve , where z, an integer, is the number of inputs the local 
distributor sells. Let  denote the net revenue of a local distributor from selling z 
inputs, and let . Assume that  decreases in z and that there 
exists a unique  that maximizes .12
In the first stage, infinitely many independent producers decide whether or not to enter the 
upstream production industry. Each producer that decides to enter develops exactly one product 
incurring some fixed cost f. Denote by h the number of upstream producers that decide to enter.
11. For concreteness, one may think of inputs as movies, of local distributors as movie theaters, and of dis-
tributor chains as movie theater chains. Alternatively, one may think of inputs as TV-programming, of 
local distributors as cable operators, and of distributor chains as MSOs.
12. In some industries it may be natural to model upstream products as horizontally differentiated. As long 
as the incremental revenue of selling another upstream product in the final consumer market decreases in 
the number of products sold, which is a natural assumption, the positive predictions of our model are 
unchanged. As discussed below, however, the welfare conclusions may change.
nt
m S t 1=
l
nt=
g z( )
R z( ) zg z( )=
D R z( ) R z( ) R z 1–( )–{ }= D R z( )
z * R z( )
Page 9
In the second stage, producers  that entered sell their products to distributor 
chains . Each producer simultaneously negotiates with each distributor chain about the 
price that the distributor chain pays for the right to sell the product. Distributor chain t and pro-
ducer p face a bargaining problem , a situation where the bargaining 
parties  split the pie  if they come to an agreement and receive their breakdown pay-
offs  otherwise. In each bilateral bargaining problem, players are assumed to take the out-
comes of all other bargaining problems as given. Thus, the producer’s fall-back position, , is 
the payment it receives from all other distributor chains minus the cost he incurred to develop the 
product, and the distributor chain’s fallback position, , is its payoff from settling all other bar-
gaining problems.
The pie the bargaining parties are bargaining over, , is the benefit of an agreement 
between the two parties. Thus, in the case where  one has . That is, the 
pie the players are bargaining over is the incremental benefit of selling the product by all distribu-
tors that belong to the distributor chain, given that the distributor chain reached agreements with 
all other producers. In the case where , one has . That is, there is no added ben-
efit for a distributor chain from reaching an agreement with the producer, given that it reached 
agreements in all other bargaining problems.
Formally, given that h producers have entered in the first stage, the second-stage subgame, 
, is the family of all bilateral bargaining problems between the producers and distributor 
chains, i.e.,
p=1,… h,( )
t=1,… l,( )
t p,( ) p t p,( ) dtp dpt,( ), ,Æ æ
t p,( ) p t p,( )
dt
p dp
t
,( )
dp
t
dt
p
p p t,( )
h z *£ p p t,( ) nt D R h( )=
h z *> p p t,( ) 0=
G h( )
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 Note that  is a combination of interdependent bargaining problems. 
A settlement to  is an array , where 
 for each . Here,  is the share of  that the distributor chain keeps 
from selling the product developed by p, and  is the payment the producer collects from distrib-
utor chain t.
2.2. Preliminaries on bargaining solutions
 The solution we use to solve a second-stage bargaining game  is the simultaneous 
Zeuthen-Nash solution developed in Chae and Heidhues (1999).13 The simultaneous Zeuthen-
Nash solution extends the well-known Nash solution in two different directions. First, it extends 
the Nash solution to situations where a player bargains with multiple players simultaneously. In 
the second-stage bargaining game , for instance, a producer bargains with multiple distribu-
tor chains simultaneously. Second, the simultaneous Zeuthen-Nash solution extends the Nash 
solution to situations where a negotiating party is a coalition of agents. In the bargaining game 
, one type of negotiating party is a distributor chain, which is a coalition of local distribu-
tors. 
13. Harsanyi (1956) shows the equivalence of Zeuthen’s (1930) and Nash’s (1950) solutions.
G h( ) t p,( ) p t p,( ) dtp dpt,( ), ,Æ æ p 1 … h t 1 … l, ,=;, ,==
G h( )
G h( ) x y,( ) xtp ypt,( )p 1 … h t 1 … l, ,=;, ,==
xt
p yp
t
+ p t p,( )= t p,( ) xtp p t p,( )
yp
t
G h( )
G h( )
G h( )
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For the purpose of setting up the basic structure that is used to generalize the Nash solution, 
we will here introduce the players’ preferences, a two-person bargaining problem, the Zeuthen-
Nash solution, and some of its properties.
 Assumption 1. Players’ preferences can be represented by a smooth and increasing von Neu-
mann-Morgenstern utility function, .14
During a bargaining process, a player is typically viewed as facing a gamble in which with 
probability q, he receives payoff  and with probability , the negotiation breaks down 
and he receives payoff . Let  be the certainty equivalent of such a gamble, 
i.e.,
 .
A player’s risk concession,
,
 is the amount he is willing to concede in order to avoid the chance of a breakdown. 
 Definition 1. The marginal risk concession of a player is defined as
.
It will be denoted .15
14. A smooth function is one that is n times differentiable for any n.
v x( )
xa da+ 1 q–
da sa q xa da da,+,( )
sa q xa da da,+,( ) va1– qva xa da+( ) 1 q–( )va da( )+[ ]=
ca q xa da da,+,( ) xa da sa q xa da da,+,( )–+=
limq 1fi
ca q xa da da,+,( )
1 q–( )-----------------------------------------
m a xa da ),(
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The marginal risk concession is the rate of change in the risk concession as the probability of 
a breakdown approaches zero. The Zeuthen-Nash solution, introduced below, equalizes the mar-
ginal risk concessions across players. It thus captures the notion that, while negotiations never 
break down in equilibrium, it is the fear of a breakdown that restrains players’ demands so the 
bargaining problem can be resolved. It is easy to check that
. (1)
 Note in particular that one has . We make the following two assumptions: 
 Assumption 2.  is decreasing in  for all . 
 Assumption 3.  is increasing and convex in .
Assumption 2 ensures that the marginal risk concession of a player is decreasing in his fall-
back position, which is his wealth in the event that the bargaining breaks down. Because the 
Zeuthen-Nash solution equalizes the players’ marginal risk concessions, Assumption 2 implies 
that the better the fall-back position of an individual player is, the stronger a negotiator he 
becomes. 
To assume that the marginal risk concession is increasing in  is natural and indeed satisfied 
by a broad class of preferences. This class includes all risk averse preferences and all preferences 
15. Aumann and Kurz (1977) call this the “fear of ruin”. They also show that for the kind of bargaining 
problems considered in this paper, the Nash solution equalizes the fear of ruin or marginal risk concession 
across players.
m a xa da ),(
va xa da+( ) va da( )–
va ¢ xa da+( )
------------------------------------------------=
m a 0 da ),( 0=
m a xa da ),( da xa 0>
m a xa da ),( xa
xa
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that can be represented by utility functions with constant relative risk aversion.16 The convexity 
of an individual’s marginal risk concession with respect to  implies that for any positive integer 
n,
.
The inequality states that the sum of marginal risk concessions for evenly split parts of a certain 
amount  is not higher than the marginal risk concession of the full amount. The importance 
and intuitive appeal of Assumption 3 will become apparent once we introduce the marginal risk 
concession of a coalition.
It turns out that Assumptions 2 and 3 are satisfied by all risk averse preferences that can be 
represented by von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions with constant hyperbolic risk aver-
sion (HARA).17 Note that Assumption 2 rules out risk neutrality. Here we think of a firm’s risk 
preference as reflecting its owner(s)’s risk preferences. If, instead, one follows the standard 
assumption that firms are risk neutral, then the outcome of our model would be independent of the 
downstream market structure. 
A two-person bargaining problem  is a situation where two agents  
split a pie of size  if they can agree on their shares, and receive payoffs  otherwise. The 
Zeuthen-Nash solution of the two-person bargaining problem is a vector  such 
that  and18
16. In particular, the concavity of a utility function is not a necessary condition.
17. This class includes all utility functions with constant relative risk aversion. See Chae and Heidhues 
(1999).
xa
m a xa da,( ) n m a
xa
n
---- da,
Ł ł
æ ö
‡
xa
a b,( ) p da db,( ), ,Æ æ a b,( )
p da db,( )
xa d+ a xb d+ b,( )
xa xb+ p=
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.
Since  is increasing in  by Assumption 3, there exists a unique Zeuthen-Nash 
solution for any two-person bargaining problem.
 Following the approach of Chae and Heidhues (1999), we submit that the equalization of the 
marginal risk concession is the defining characteristic of the Nash solution that is generalizable to 
bargaining situations involving coalitions. The solution to any bargaining problem should equal-
ize, across parties, the amount a party is willing to concede in order to avoid the breakdown of 
negotiations. The amount is measured in our framework by the marginal risk concession of the 
negotiating party. In our model, a party can be either an individual or a coalition of individuals. 
We thus need to define the marginal risk concession of a coalition. 
 Definition 2. The marginal risk concession of a coalition with  identical members is denoted 
and defined as
,
where a denotes the representative member of the coalition.
Here the marginal risk concession of a coalition is defined as the sum of the marginal risk 
concessions of its members. It is quite natural to presume that the amount the coalition is willing 
to concede in order to avoid the chance of a breakdown is the sum of what its members are willing 
to concede. 
18. Technically, for the bargaining problem introduced above, the following equation is equivalent to the 
first order condition of the Nash maximization.
m a xa da ),( m b xb db ),(=
m a xa da ),( xa
nt
m t xt dt ),( nt m a
xt
nt
---
dt
nt
---
ł
ö
,
Ł
æ
=
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Regarding the split of a payoff within a coalition, note that the members of a coalition split 
not only the equilibrium payoff but also the breakdown payoff. Thus we do not allow the mem-
bers of a coalition to write a binding contract regarding the split of a pie available in the future.
As a strategic motivation for Definition 2, consider a Rubinstein-type (1982) alternating-offer 
model in which a coalition member is delegated to bargain on behalf of the coalition with an out-
sider, knowing that the coalition’s share is split equally between all of its members. There is an 
exogenously given probability of a break down after an offer is rejected. There exists a unique 
subgame perfect equilibrium for this game. As the break-down probability approaches zero, the 
marginal risk concession of the coalition as defined above is what is equalized with the marginal 
risk concession of the outsider in the solution to the above strategic game.19
Given Definition 2, Assumption 3 implies that sharing the risk of a breakdown between mul-
tiple agents (weakly) decreases their marginal risk concession. Thus, if a coalition of agents nego-
tiates jointly and splits the risk of a breakdown across its members, the coalition will be in a 
stronger bargaining position.
Technically, it should also be noted that the marginal risk concession of a coalition is smooth, 
increasing in , and decreasing in . Thus, whenever two coalitions face each other in a single 
bargaining problem, there exists a unique solution which equalizes the coalitions’ marginal risk 
concessions. 
Below we interpret a coalition as the outcome of some merger process. Definition 2, thus, 
implies that firms that merge simply share the ownership of all of their assets. For concreteness, 
19. See Chae and Heidhues (1999).
xt dt
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one may think of entrepreneurs swapping stocks or exchanging ownership rights. Alternatively, a 
coalition can be understood as a joint venture in which firms are committed to negotiate jointly 
with suppliers. Definition 2, however, rules out a merger in which one player buys the other out. 
The main reason why we do not consider buy-outs is that a buy-out is always dominated by joint 
ownership in our model. The benefits of joint ownership are twofold: First, the players can share 
the risk of a break down in negotiations, which makes them (weakly) stronger negotiators. Sec-
ond, a buy-out is costly, thereby lowering a firm’s breakdown point, which weakens its bargaining 
position. If, however, forming coalitions is exogenously ruled out, then even with homogeneous 
agents one can show that buy-outs are profitable under certain conditions. 
2.3. Solution to the game 
We will now introduce a solution to the two-stage game introduced earlier. For simplicity, 
assume that all distributors have identical preferences and that all producers have identical prefer-
ences. Specifically, all distributors (not distributor chains) have the same marginal risk concession 
 and all producers have the same marginal risk concession .
 Definition 3. A simultaneous Zeuthen-Nash solution is a settlement  to  such that for 
any ,
, (2)
 for  and  otherwise, (3)
. (4)
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Equation (2) states that a simultaneous Zeuthen-Nash solution to  equalizes the mar-
ginal risk concessions of the bargaining parties in each bargaining problem 
. Equation (3) states that the breakdown point of a distributor chain in 
bargaining with a producer is the amount it receives if all but the bargaining with the producer are 
resolved. Likewise, equation (4) states that a producer’s breakdown point in bargaining with a dis-
tributor chain is the payment it receives from all other distributor chains minus the cost f it 
incurred to produce the movie. Note that there can be multiple simultaneous Zeuthen-Nash solu-
tions to . 
For any settlement of , one can represent the overall payoffs for the distributor 
chains and producers by a vector  such that
 if  and  otherwise. (5)
, (6)
Equation (5) states that the overall payoff a distributor chain receives is equal to the revenue with 
one less producer plus the shares of the pies it receives through bargaining. Equation (6) states 
that the overall payoff a producer receives is the sum of the payments it receives from all 
distributor chains. 
A simultaneous Zeuthen-Nash solution  will be called symmetric if it satisfies 
 for any . (7)
Equation (7) imposes symmetry across the identical upstream producers. 
G h( )
t p,( ) p t p,( ) dtp dpt,( ), ,Æ æ
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 Definition 4. An array  is a symmetric sequential solution to the two-stage game if  
is a symmetric simultaneous Zeuthen-Nash solution to  such that 
 for the representative producer p, (8)
and if for some symmetric simultaneous Zeuthen-Nash solution  to , one has
  for the representative producer p. (9)
Equations (8) and (9) are similar to the standard “zero-profit” condition under free entry. 
They require that upstream producers enter the market until it is unprofitable to do so, correctly 
anticipating the solutions to the subsequent cooperative subgames  and  in making 
their entry decisions. We thus require the analog of Selten’s (1965) subgame perfection for our 
two-stage game, which includes “cooperative” subgames. 
One can think of an alternative solution concept for our two-stage game:
 Definition 4´. An array  is a symmetric forward-induction solution to the two-stage game 
if  is a symmetric simultaneous Zeuthen-Nash solution to  such that 
 for the representative producer p, (10)
and if for any symmetric simultaneous Zeuthen-Nash solution  to , one has
  for the representative producer p. (11)
h x y, ,( ) x y,( )
G h( )
Yp f 0‡–
x˜ y˜,( ) G h 1+( )
Y˜ p f 0<–
G h( ) G h 1+( )
h x y, ,( )
x y,( ) G h( )
Yp f 0‡–
x˜ y˜,( ) G h 1+( )
Y˜ p f– 0<
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The latter definition uses the analog of the forward-induction principle inherent in Kohlberg 
and Mertens’s (1986) stable sets. Producers signal by entry that they expect to coordinate on a 
second-stage bargaining solution in which they receive non-negative profits. Thus, a solution can-
not be sustained if there exists a second-stage solution in which an additional movie producer can 
make profits. Since the solution concept in Definition 4´ is a rather strong one, our analyses will 
be based on Definition 4.
2.4. Existence of solution
In order to establish the existence of a symmetric sequential solution to the two-stage game, it 
will be sufficient to prove the existence of a solution to every subgame . 
Theorem 1. There exists a symmetric solution to any subgame .
We will prove the theorem below. It is easy to check that
 Lemma 1. If , then  and .
To establish the existence of a solution for any subgame  with , it will be useful 
to reduce some of the equations defining the solution into a simple relation. In order to do this, we 
observe from equations (2), (3), and (4) that the share of a distributor chain t from bargaining with 
a representative producer, , is connected to other distributor chains’ bargaining problems only 
through the producer’s fall-back position, . Using of this observation, we first look for a solu-
tion to the set of bargaining problems involving distributor chain t while holding the representa-
G h( )
G h( )
h z *> Xt ntR z*( )= Yp 0=
G h( ) h z *£
xt
p
dp
t
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tive producer’s fall-back position,  ( ), fixed. Then we establish the existence 
of a solution where the producer’s fall-back position in bargaining with distributor chain t is deter-
mined from the producer’s bargaining with all other distributor chains. 
To characterize the solution set in relation to the symmetric breakdown point, , we define
 Definition 5. For , the feedback correspondence  is defined by 
 
The feedback correspondence maps the solution payment the representative producer 
receives in all other local markets into the set of solution payments it receives from distributor 
chain t. It is easy to check that  is upper hemi continuous. Thus  has a closed graph 
and therefore its maximum and minimum elements exist. Furthermore, we show the following in 
the  Appendix:
 Lemma 2. Suppose . Both the maximum and minimum elements of  are increasing 
in .
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To establish the existence of a solution to all cooperative subgames in which , we will 
establish the existence of a solution that is best from a producer’s point of view. Let  denote 
the maximum element of . 
Proof of Theorem 1. The solution to any subgame for which  has been specified in Lemma 
1. Consider a subgame in which . Note that  is increasing by Lemma 2 for such a 
subgame. Thus, , where , defines an 
increasing mapping from  to itself. Hence, the mapping has a 
fixed point by Tarski’s fixed point theorem.20 Each  is a symmetric solution to the set of 
bargaining problems involving theater chain t. Q.E.D.
We believe that bargaining is a natural mechanism to determine prices in interconnected 
bilateral monopoly markets. Using the demand function in the product market to model substitut-
ability between movie producers, we identified the core and the simultaneous Zeuthen-Nash solu-
tion for the input-market bargaining problem. Theorem 1 ensures the existence of a bargaining 
solution. We cannot, however, establish the uniqueness of such a solution in general.
3.  Distributor integration
3.1. Effects on the market
We want to analyze how integration between distributor chains affects the input market price 
and quantity in equilibrium. Before we tackle this problem head-on, we will first look at a closely 
20. See Tarski (1955).
h z *£
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related problem. The question is whether larger distributor chains can in some sense shift input 
costs to smaller ones.21 Since the producers’ profits are driven down toward zero under free entry, 
input costs are entirely borne by the distributors as a whole. Thus the question can be formally put 
forward as asking whether a larger distributor chain pays a lower per-local market price. The 
answer to this question will be yes if the following condition is satisfied:
 Week Feedback Condition.  is increasing in x.
Note that in the one-producer case the Week Feedback Condition trivially follows from 
Assumption 3. In the n-producer case, the above condition states that the direct effect of receiving 
another unit in the bargaining problem at hand dominates the feedback effect of receiving another 
unit in all other bargaining problems. If the above condition is satisfied, a larger distributor chain 
pays a lower price per local market. In the  Appendix, we prove that
 Proposition 1. Let the Week Feedback Condition be satisfied. Then in any symmetric simulta-
neous Zeuthen-Nash solution to ,  implies .
We now analyze how integration between distributor chains can affect input market prices. 
Recall that the second-stage solution may not be unique. Thus, in the comparative statics that fol-
low, we work with the supremum and infimum of the solution set as suggested by Milgrom and 
Roberts (1994). We find a sufficient condition under which integration between two distributor 
chains leads to a decrease of the set of second-stage solution payments to the producers. That is, 
21. Waterman (1996) argues that large distributor chains may force their input price below the producer’s 
average cost, thus “free riding” on the level of product variety supported by other distributors. 
m a x R h 1–( ) h 1–( )+ x,( )
G h( ) ni nj> xip/ni xjp/nj>
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for a fixed number of producers, integration between distributor chains lowers the input market 
price they have to pay. Integration increases the bargaining power not only of the integrating dis-
tributor chains but also of all other distributor chains. 
Consider two distributor chains i and j that may or may not be integrated. As will be shown in 
Theorem 2, their integration increases the set of their solution payoffs (and thus decreases the 
payments to producers) if the following condition is satisfied:
 Integration Condition.
 
That the above condition is satisfied in the one producer case is shown in the Appendix. The 
condition is also satisfied if , that is, if the distributor chains that may integrate pay 
the same price per local market when they do not integrate. In this case, one has 
, which implies that the amount at stake and the breakdown 
point on the left hand side of the Integration Condition is equal to the amount at stake and the 
breakdown points on the right hand side.
In general, integrating theater chains may result in different breakdown points for distribu-
tors. We cannot, however, predict how redistribution of the breakdown payments affects a coali-
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tion’s marginal risk concession. The Integration Condition is an aggregation condition which 
ensures that such a redistribution does not increase the marginal risk concession of the coalition.
Theorem 2. If the Integration Condition is satisfied and if , then any integration between 
distributor chains reduces both the supremum and infimum of the set of symmetric second-stage 
solution payments to producers.
We will prove the theorem below. We need to specify possible reactions in all other markets 
in order to understand the effect of integration between two distributor chains. To do this, we par-
tition the set of distributor chains into distributor chains 1 to k and distributor chains k+1 to l. We 
use the fact mentioned earlier that the bargaining problems involving the distributor chains 1 to k 
interact with the bargaining problems involving the distributor chains k+1 to l through the produc-
ers fall-back positions only. Hence, we can summarize markets k+1 to l by the (symmetric) 
amount  that a representative producer receives in those markets.
Before we examine how second-stage payments to producers are affected by the market 
structure in the distributor industry, we first establish how the set of solutions in markets 1 to k 
depends on w. For expositional simplicity, we will focus on the supremum of the solution set.
 Definition 6. Let K be a group of distributor chains. For , the feedback correspondence for 
group K as a correspondence  such that 
 if  is a solution to the simultaneous equation system
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.
Note that  is well defined, since for any given s, 
 is a monotonically increasing mapping 
from a nonempty, compact, and convex set  of the Euclidean space into itself. 
Hence, for any given w, there exists a solution to this system of equations by Tarski’s fixed point 
theorem. 
 Definition 7. For , the supremum payment to a producer in bargaining with the distributor 
chains in K, for a given payment w from all other distributor chains, is defined as 
.
The following proposition formalizes the notion that a producer becomes a tougher negotia-
tor in market 1 to k if it receives a higher payment in the remaining markets.
 Lemma 3.  is increasing in .
The proof is relegated to the Appendix. When distributor chains i and j are integrated, we will 
denote the integrated distributor chain by c. In the Appendix we show that
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 Lemma 4. Let  and suppose that the Integration Condition is satisfied. Then, for any given 
payment w from all other distributor chains, the producer’s solution payment is lower if it faces an 
integrated party, i.e., .
This enables us to establish Theorem 2. The formal proof of Theorem 2 is delegated to the  
Appendix. We illustrate the proof in Figure 1. Both functions in Figure 1 that are represented by 
the solid lines, are increasing by Lemma 3. The supremum payment a producer receives in this 
cooperative subgame is represented by the sum of the coordinates w, u at the crossing point fur-
thest to the North East in Figure 1. By Lemma 4, one has  for all w, which 
implies that the supremum solution payment to producers decreases whenever two distributor 
chains integrate. 
Figure 1
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Let  denote the set of all partitions of the set of all distributors, and let  denote elements 
of . For our model,  is the set of all possible market structures in the distributor industry. 
 Definition 8.  is more concentrated than  if  can be obtained from  by forming unions of 
elements of . 
The relation “is more concentrated than” induces a partial ordering on . Theorem 2 implies 
the first main result of this paper.
 Proposition 2. For any fixed number producers for which , any increase in concentration 
decreases the set of solution payments to the producers.
The proposition formalizes the notion that the price for the right to sell the product in each 
local market falls if the national distributor industry is more concentrated. That is, across-local-
market integration results in increased market power in the input market. However, the free entry 
conditions, equations (8) and (9), ensure that the producers’ profits are close to zero in any solu-
tion. Thus, as the market power of the distributor chain industry increases, the number of 
upstream products developed falls. This is formalized in
 Proposition 3. Both the maximum and minimum number of products developed in a symmetric 
sequential solution to the two-stage game are (weakly) decreasing in the distributors industry’s 
concentration. 
G g g ¢ ,
G G
g g ¢ g g ¢
g ¢
G
h z *£
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Proposition 3 reveals that distributor chains contemplating whether or not to merge must 
compare two effects. The direct effect that a merger tends to increase their bargaining power ver-
sus the indirect effect that a merger reduces the upstream variety available to them. Furthermore, 
Proposition 3 reveals that the remaining downstream firms’ profits may fall through the reduced 
variety available to them. The effects of a downstream merger on consumer surplus and welfare 
are discussed below.
3.2. Effects on welfare
 In our model, any concentration in the distributor industry that reduces the number of prod-
ucts developed decreases welfare. To show this, we first establish that in any solution, the number 
of products that are actually developed is less than the socially optimal number. 
From the inverse demand curve in each local market, it follows that the total surplus within a 
local market is . Thus, if all local distributors decide to show h movies, the national 
consumer surplus is .
 Proposition 4. In a symmetric sequential solution to the two-stage game, the actual entry is less 
than (or equal to) the socially optimal entry.
Proof: The social optimality requires entry as long as the increase in the consumer surplus and the 
net revenue from selling the product is greater than the cost of producing the movie. The overall 
benefit of adding an extra movie is . Thus, the socially optimal level of entry h* is the max-
imum integer h such that
S z 1=
h g z( )
m S z 1=
h g z( ){ }
mg h( )
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,
where  is a decreasing function. However, in any symmetric sequential equilibrium, one has
,
and thus . Q.E.D.
Suppose, for instance, that the demand function is linear: . Then the socially 
optimal entry h* satisfies 
 and .
On the other hand, in a symmetric sequential equilibrium, one has
. 
Thus, whenever h* > 1, one has h < h*. 
In our model the market thus provides less than the optimal product variety. Thus, the follow-
ing welfare result is very intuitive. It would, however, be reversed if one had a setup with exces-
sive product proliferation such as Salop’s circular city model.
 Proposition 5. Both the highest and the lowest levels of welfare in a symmetric sequential solu-
tion to the two-stage game are (weakly) decreasing in the distributor industry’s concentration. 
mg h( ) f‡
g h( )
mg h( ) m D R h( ) Yp f‡>>
h h*£
g z( ) a bz–=
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Proof: By Proposition 3, the maximum and minimum number of movies produced in a symmetric 
sequential solution to the two-stage game are (weakly) decreasing in the theater industry’s con-
centration. Using Proposition 4, it is easy to check that this lowers the highest and lowest levels of 
welfare. 
Q.E.D. 
4.  Conclusion
In this paper, we modeled both price formation and the entry of upstream producers in an 
input market. Using a bargaining framework, we showed that a higher degree of concentration 
among downstream distributors reduces incentives to enter the upstream production industry. The 
reason is that higher concentration among downstream distributors reduces the bargaining power 
of upstream producers.
The result provides some rationale for restrictions on the national size of distributor chains, 
such as movie theater chains or multiple cable television system operators (MSOs). Our results 
have implications for many other industries in which a retailer has some local monopoly power in 
the output market and purchases products from multiple monopolistic producers.
One maintained assumption in our approach was that there was no new entry of downstream 
firms. If new downstream firms could enter after incurring some fixed costs, the extent of entry 
would depend on their bargaining power. Thus, the ability to form distributor chains would affect 
the number of distributors. In such circumstances, policies toward distributor chains should be 
formulated considering their effects on the entry of both the producers and distributors. Another 
maintained assumption was that there were no merger activities among the producers. This 
assumption can also be relaxed with the obvious result that producers’ bargaining power will 
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increase. The important point is that the framework developed in this paper can be fruitfully 
employed to analyze any of these alternative scenarios.
We believe our model is useful in highlighting the trade-off policy makers face in various 
industries. Consider for instance the recent merger between AT&T and MediaOne mentioned in 
the Introduction of this paper. Roughly speaking, the FCC was faced with the question of whether 
it should force AT&T to divest cable operators or relax existing national ownership restrictions. 
Lobbyists on behalf of AT&T argued that the merger would enable them to connect consumers to 
broadband cable more quickly. First, take these long term decisions as given. Then our model pre-
dicts that this merger will increase AT&T’s bargaining power vis-a-vis program suppliers, thereby 
increasing the returns on the long term investments. However, the merger will also, according to 
our model, tend to reduce programming variety and thereby lower the returns on the long term 
investment. Interpreting AT&T’s argument within our model, the first effect must dominate the 
second. If so, the FCC decision to substantially relax national ownership restrictions can be 
viewed as encouraging AT&T’s investment in broadband cable while discouraging the develop-
ment of new independent programming and thereby the investment of other cable operators. 
This policy application also highlights the importance of investigating the effects of vertical 
integration between downstream distributors and upstream producers. It would be interesting to 
see if our model could be extended to investigate the effects of integration between a group of 
movie producers and a group of movie theaters. 
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 Appendix A.
Proof of Lemma 2
By Definition 5 any element of  has to satisfy 
. Recall that,  is a 
smooth function, which is positive for all . Also, recall that, by Assumption 2,  
is increasing and convex in , and, by Assumption 2,  is decreasing in . The above 
lemma is illustrated in Figure A1, for .
A solution is any crossing point of  and . Because, by Assumption 2, 
 the minimum and maximum  satisfying equation 
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 must be decreasing in , as illustrated above. 
Thus, the minimum and maximum  is increasing in . 
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1
 Suppose not. Then there exist a  for which . Substituting the marginal 
risk concession of its members for the marginal risk concession of the coalition into Definition 3 
and rewriting, one has
(12)
(13)
The Week Feedback Condition implies
,
and thus equations (12) and (13) imply that
(14)
However, Assumptions 2 and 3 imply that
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contradicting equation (14).
Q.E.D.
 Proof of the Integration Condition in the one producer case
In the one-producer case, the Integration Condition becomes
.
This follows trivially if . Note that if  then 
. Thus  implies 
. Now we consider the case where 
. In this case, the convexity of  with respect to its first 
argument implies that 
.
Q.E.D.
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 Proof of Lemma 3
To prove Lemma 3 we will use the following two lemmas:
 Lemma A.1. For any  and  that are element of , one has 
 if and only if  for any .
Proof: Without loss of generality, let . Definition 6 implies that
,
.
Because  is increasing, one has  if and only if . Thus, one has 
 if and only if . Q.E.D.
In the following, we will denote  simply by .
 Lemma A.2. If  is increasing, then  such that  satisfies
.
Proof: Suppose . By Definition 6, . However, 
by Definition 6, one also has 
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.
Thus . Construct a sequence  by  and 
.
Since both  and  are increasing, the sequence  is monotonically increasing. 
Because each , the sequence  converges to some . This  
( ) satisfies
,
which contradicts the fact that there is no  with  that satisfies 
. Q.E.D.
Now we will prove Lemma 3. We will proceed by induction. Lemma 2 implies that  is 
increasing in w, since  Assume that  is increasing. We will show that 
 is increasing. 
Since  is increasing, Lemma A.2 implies that  such that 
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. (15)
Thus, by Lemma A.1, one has . To prove that  is 
increasing in w, let  and construct a sequence  by  and
.
Since both  and  are increasing, the sequence  is monotonically increasing. 
Because each , the sequence  converges to some 
. Thus, one has
.
Hence, . 
Q.E.D.
 Proof of Lemma 4
Consider first the situation where the distributor chains i, j are not integrated. For a given 
payment w from all other distributor chains, Definitions 5 and 7 imply that
 , (16)
for . Substituting the marginal risk concession of its members for the marginal risk con-
cession of the coalition into equation (16) and rewriting, one has
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(17)
(18)
Let  denote the solution share of the integrated coalition. Suppose . We will 
show later that if  then
(19)
Applying equations (19), (17), (18), and the Integration Condition yields:
Hence,
, (20)
which contradicts Definition 5. Thus, . Hence Definition 5 implies that 
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We will now show that if  then equation (19) holds. One has 
for the left hand side breakdown point of the above equation is smaller than the right hand side 
breakdown point and thus Assumption 2 implies that the left hand side is greater than the right 
hand side. Since , Assumption 3 implies that
Assumption 3 and Assumption 2 imply that
Q.E.D.
 Proof of Theorem 2
By definition, the supremum solution payment to a producer in the non-integrated case is
 s.t.  and , (21)
and that in the integrated case is
 s.t.  and . (22)
Lemma A.1 implies that  satisfying (21) also satisfies
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,
and that  satisfying (22) also satisfies
.
To prove , construct a sequence  by  and
.
By Lemmas 3 and 4, this sequence is monotonically increasing. Since each 
, the sequence converges to some  satisfying
.
Because  by definition, one has . The proof that the infimum is also decreasing with 
integration is similar.
Q.E.D.
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